Personhood and Abortion Essay

The topic of personhood and abortion is a very controversial one. I agree with Marquis and Thomson’s theory on how personhood does not settle the ethical debate on abortion. Therefore, I will explain Don Marquis’s argument, his critique of the traditional pro-life argument, why this argument is far off from the general idea of what a person is and why I agree with his argument. Then, I will discuss Judith Thomson’s argument and why I believe the Burglars and Seed People argument is the most persuasive. Lastly, I will describe what I believe the definition of a person is. Towards the beginning of Marquis’s article he states, â€Å"The anti-abortionist charges, not unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too broad to be acceptable†¦All this suggests that a necessary condition of resolving the abortion controversy is a more theoretical account of the wrongness of killing. † (92) I agree that personhood alone does not solve the issue of abortion. His article discusses the principle concerning the wrongness of killing. This principle entails that it is wrong to destroy cancer-cell cultures or any other human cell cultures that are done in a lab. This is far-off from what the general idea of a person is. Cells and a person share little of the same characteristics; therefore, the anti-abortionist’s principle is too broad. Marquis says, â€Å"Killing adults is wrong because it deprives them of their future. But in killing a fetus, we are also depriving it of its future. Thus, it seems inconsistent to object to one but not the other. (90) Basically, he is saying that if we think killing an adult is wrong then we ought to think that killing a fetus is wrong. Marquis concentrates on applying that personhood doesn’t matter when arguing about abortion because most arguments involving personhood are too narrow or too broad in scope. What matters is the fact that killing is depriving one of one’s future. This princ iple even suggests that fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy fall under the wrongness of killing idea. Marquis also discusses how the pro-choicer believes in a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing that fetuses do not fall under. He says that this principle is too narrow in scope and does not embrace enough. This principle would allow for the killing of infants that were mentally handicapped or ill. I agree with Marquis’s concept on how personhood does not settle this controversial issue. Just being a person does not explain why abortion is wrong. As Marquis discusses, the wrongness comes from the loss of one’s life deprives one of the future. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article begins with her saying, â€Å"Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception. I think that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. † (97) The first premise of the Potential Persons Argument says, â€Å"If it is wrong to kill persons, it is wrong to kill potential persons. † (Lecture) Thomson believes that potentially being something or someone does not give one the rights of actually being that something or someone. Therefore, a freshly implanted clump of cells in a female is no different than a new acorn growing to potentially become an oak tree. An acorn is just a potential oak tree; there is no guarantee that it indeed will grow into an oak tree, just as a clump of cells has the potential to grow into a human, but there is no guarantee this will happen. Thomson uses an interesting example in her argument. A violinist is dying and only you have the right blood type to save him. You are kidnapped overnight and the violinist’s circulatory system is plugged into yours. You have to stay plugged into him until he gets better. It is permissible for you to choose to disconnect yourself from him because you did not consent. The same idea would apply to rape and incest. Thomson says, â€Å"Even supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so; we should conclude that she is self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. † (108) This quote explains why the violinist theory would apply to rape and incest. Thomson also uses the Seed People argument, which I believe is the most persuasive argument. There are â€Å"seed people† who float in the air, land on your carpet and grow into adults. Because of this, you buy preventive screens, but the seed people pass through the screen and take root. It is permissible to get rid of the seed people because you did take preventative measures. This argument implies that abortion would be permissible if the mother did take preventative actions while having intercourse and still got pregnant. I agree with Thomson on this. If a woman is on birth control and uses a condom while having intercourse and she still gets pregnant, then it should be morally permissible for her to get an abortion. It is normal for adults to have an urge for intercourse and I believe they should be able to do so even if they do not want a baby. Intercourse is not just about pleasure, but about love as well. Therefore, it should be permissible for adults who have had protected intercourse to get an abortion. Some people might object to Thomson’s theory on the seed people because you are still â€Å"killing† a person. But, you have the right to what happens in your body and therefore I believe you have the right to make the decision for an abortion. Overall, I agree with Thomson’s article. I like that she starts with a controversial pro-life argument and then finishes with a pro-choice conclusion. She used great analogies when presenting her arguments. What makes up a person is another controversial issue. In my opinion, a person is a self-conscious or rational being with the ability to reason and a notion of self-identity. Although, I think an individual’s definition of a person may be based upon whether they believe abortion is morally permissible or not. One might try to fix the definition of personhood in order to get the desired outcome about abortion. For example, an individual who thinks abortion is morally permissible might define a person as someone who has the ability to reason, ability to consent, ability to control one’s attention and action, ability to communicate, and ability to be morally responsible. By this definition, a fetus would not really be a person because fetuses can not do all of these things. Therefore, abortion would be morally permissible because the fetus is not a person.